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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REFLECTIONS ON PREPAREDNESS:
PANDEMIC PLANNING IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
STEWART SIMONSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
It may seem hard to believe today, but there was a time when pandemic
influenza was not a subject of much interest anywhere outside of public
health agencies like the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Indeed, the whole history of influenza preparedness
can be summarized as decades of inactivity followed by months of anxiety
and years of second-guessing. If the recent criticism of the World Health
Organization (WHO) is any indication, H1N1 seems to be following this
pattern.1 It is almost as if Santayana had influenza in mind when he
observed that “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.”2 And influenza has quite a past.3 The 1918 pandemic was the
most lethal plague in human history—killing between fifty million and one
hundred million people worldwide in a matter of months.4 If we are to
avoid this magnitude of devastation from occurring again, we must learn
from our experience with influenza. My analysis of the facts and my
experience working on pandemic preparedness has taught me the following
lessons:

* Former Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Currently, Vice
President, SRA International, Inc. in Washington, DC. Special thanks to Greg Folkers, Stuart
Nightingale, James LeDuc, Ladd Wiley, and Claudia Simonson for their helpful comments.
1. See Robert Roos, Who Says H1N1 Pandemic is Over, U. OF MINN. CTR. FOR
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POL’Y, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/
content/influenza/swineflu/news/aug1010who.html (summarizing WHO’s response to H1N1
and its defense against critics who have accused the agency of “exaggerating the pandemic
threat”). In the case of H1N1, decades of inactivity were punctuated by roughly six years of
concerted effort (including funding) to prepare for a pandemic.
2. GEORGE SANTAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE, 284 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1980).
3. See generally David M. Morens et al., Pandemic Influenza’s 500th Anniversary, 51
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1442 (2010) (summarizing the history of pandemic influenza).
4. Jeffery K. Taubenberger & David M. Morens, 1918 Influenza: The Mother of All
Pandemics, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15, 15 (2006).
5
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 Serious and sustained pandemic preparedness can trace its roots to
2003/2004 at the earliest—one might argue 1997, since that is
when H5N1 emerged in Hong Kong,5 but the attention to influenza
following the first H5N1 outbreak was relatively short-lived.
 Pandemic preparedness has not been a part of the national dialogue
long enough to be securely imbedded in the policymaking process—
this means it is highly vulnerable to shrinking budgets and shifting
priorities.6
 Global influenza surveillance is at the very heart of our national
security and must be funded accordingly. If effective countermeasures,
especially vaccines, are to be developed and distributed in time to
save lives and prevent the type of chaos that was commonplace
during the 1918 outbreak, a newly emerging pandemic strain must
be identified as early as technically possible.
 Better vaccines, antiviral drugs, and diagnostics need to be
discovered and licensed. This means consistently and aggressively
funding the NIH and CDC influenza programs.7 A 1918-like
pandemic cannot be contained or even modulated with a campaign
vaccine8 or the current generation of antiviral drugs and diagnostics.9
5. Carolyn Buxton Bridges et al., Risk of Influenza A (H5N1) Infection among Health
Care Workers Exposed to Patients with Influenza A (H5N1), Hong Kong, 181 J. INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 344, 344 (2000).
6. See Martin Matishak, Former Senators Criticize Possible Cut to Bioshield Funds,
GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, July 13, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100713_6726.php.
7. See Flu (Influenza): 2009 H1N1, Seasonal, Avian (Bird), Pandemic, NAT’L INST. OF
ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/flu/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Nov. 17, 2010) (The NIH influenza programs include not only scientific research, but
also public awareness information about understanding the flu.). Flu (Influenza): NIAID
Influenza Funding Opportunities, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES,
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/Flu/Research/Pages/fundingOps.aspx (last visited Nov. 17,
2010) (highlighting the funding opportunities available for influenza research); Seasonal
Influenza (Flu), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2010) (stressing that not only does the CDC influenza program offer research and
information, but also provides flu surveillance and tracking).
8. By campaign vaccine, I mean a vaccine produced once per year (or season)
according to specifications set for that year (or season). Each year (or season) requires a new
vaccine with different specifications. In the case of influenza, the trivalent vaccine contains
antigens effective against three influenza viruses that are judged by public health experts to be
the viruses that will predominate that season. Influenza viruses rapidly mutate, so a vaccine
effective one season must be modified to be effective the following season. The Influenza
vaccine production process takes at least six months. There are two main types of influenza:
influenza A and influenza B. Influenza A viruses are divided into subtypes identified by two
surface proteins: hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N). There are sixteen hemagglutinin
subtypes and nine neuraminidase subtypes. Influenza B viruses are not divided into subtypes.
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 As an expression of self-interest, the U.S. and other developed
countries need to provide substantial pandemic preparedness funding
and technical expertise to the developing world, including assistance
building disease surveillance systems, laboratory capacity, and
vaccine production infrastructure.
 If we declare victory and move on after H1N1, we will be laying the
foundation for a 1918-like catastrophe. H1N1 was not the event
about which scientists and public health leaders have been warning—
it was, at most, a dress rehearsal.
In the next few pages, I will outline a brief history of pandemic
preparedness between 2001 and 2009.
This period covers the
development of today’s pandemic preparedness and response plan in the
United States, including building vaccine infrastructure, funding research
and development, stockpiling vaccine and antiviral drugs, mobilizing
international support, and establishing other elements of preparedness.
While 1957, 1968, 1976/1977, and 1997 were all years of substantial
influenza activity or anxiety,10 the flu has never had much luck capturing the
attention of policymakers for any length of time and little from those years
was integrated into a national pandemic preparedness plan. Indeed, it is
probably not too much of an exaggeration to say that for most of the last
fifty years or more, the flu has ranked just ahead of the common cold in
terms of the perception of threat by policymakers. In 2001, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) pandemic preparedness

For the 2010/2011 season, the vaccine protects against H1N1 (Pandemic), H3N2, and
influenza B. See Catherine Gerdil, The Annual Production Cycle for Influenza Vaccine, 21
VACCINE 1776, 1776-79 (2003); Types of Influenza Viruses, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/types.htm (last updated Sept. 17, 2010);
Selecting the Viruses in the Seasonal Influenza (Flu) Vaccine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/virusqa.htm (last updated Oct.
6, 2010).
9. Michael T. Osterholm, Preparing for the Next Pandemic, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED.,
1839, 1840 (2005). See Gardiner Harris, After Delay, U.S. Faces Line for Flu Drug, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/07/politics/07flu.html (The Bush
Administration strengthened both international and domestic disease surveillance programs.
These programs included buying drugs like Tamiflu and investing in research to develop
alternative methods of making flu vaccines.).
10. See Joel C. Gaydos et al., Swine Influenza A Outbreak, Fort Dix, New Jersey, 1976,
12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 23, 23 (2006) (detailing the swine flu outbreak in 197677); Lone Simonsen et al., The Impact of Influenza Epidemics on Mortality: Introducing a
Severity Index, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1944, 1949 (1997); René Snacken et al., The Next
Influenza Pandemic: Lessons from Hong Kong, 1997, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 195,
195-97 (1999) (highlighting the emergence of avian flu and looking at the historical trends of
new strains of influenza).
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plan was still a draft—albeit a working one—and remained so until 2005.11
Accordingly, this article will not focus on events and milestones that
occurred prior to 2001.
II. MY BACKGROUND
From 1995 to 1999, I was counsel to Tommy G. Thompson, thenGovernor of Wisconsin.12 In addition to the usual duties of an in-house
lawyer, I was responsible for emergency preparedness policy and planning
in the Office of the Governor. As a consequence, I had been involved on
the periphery in public health preparedness for the state, including
biodefense—to the extent we were doing work in this area.13
In late 1997, I read an article in The New Yorker by Malcolm Gladwell
about the 1918 influenza pandemic and an effort then underway to obtain
DNA from the bodies of miners who died during the pandemic and were
buried in the permafrost in Norway.14 Prior to reading the article, I really
had little appreciation for the enormity of the 1918 outbreak and its impact
on every corner of the globe. I had heard stories about one of my great
aunts dying from the Spanish Flu,15 but beyond that I knew nothing. So, the

11. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). The work to finalize the
HHS pandemic plan was ably led by Dr. Bruce Gellin, HHS Deputy Assistant Secretary and
Director, National Vaccine Program Office. His contributions to pandemic preparedness are
too numerous to list and his positive influence on U.S. vaccine policy extends well beyond
influenza. It was a privilege collaborating with Dr. Gellin on pandemic preparedness.
12. WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, THE WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 301-53 (2009), available
at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/bb/97bb/ch6a.pdf. See also Tommy Thompson: Secretary of
Health & Human Services (2001 – 2005), WHITE HOUSE, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/government/thompson-bio.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Tommy
Thompson].
13. This included a state effort to obtain funding from the CDC to build public health
preparedness capacity in Wisconsin. In February 1999, CDC launched the Public Health
Preparedness and Response to Bioterrorism Cooperative Agreement Program, which made
approximately $41 million available to states to build a public health preparedness
infrastructure. See Statement on Bioterrorism Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and
Gov’t Info., Subcomm. on Youth Violence, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. passim
(1999) (statement of Dr. James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t990
420a.html. I worked closely on this initiative with Dr. Jeffrey Davis of the Wisconsin Division
of Public Health and Dr. Ronald Laessig of the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene. Dr.
Davis and Dr. Laessig were the thought leaders for our proposal to the CDC and both taught
me much about public health preparedness.
14. Malcolm Gladwell, The Dead Zone, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 1997, at 52, 52-54.
15. See ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918
passim (Cambridge University Press 1989) (describing the historical context of the 1918
pandemic, also known as the Spanish Flu). See also Taubenberger & Morens, supra note 4
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Gladwell piece really captured my interest. In the article, he noted that
public health authorities in the U.S. were always concerned about a 1918like virus emerging.16 A few weeks later, I mentioned the Gladwell article to
Governor Thompson and asked him what he knew about the 1918
pandemic. The Governor knew more about it than I had prior to reading
the Gladwell piece, but, like me, he was interested in learning more—
specifically, how well prepared we were for something like it today. The
Governor suggested I do a little research on pandemic preparedness and
give him a briefing on my findings.17 I have to admit this was more of an
academic interest than anything else. We had so many other policy issues
to work through (everything from Private School Choice in Milwaukee to
Indian gaming to Truth-in-Sentencing) that I really did not think of pandemic
preparedness as a pressing concern for the State of Wisconsin (or, for that
matter, any state).
It was, however, interesting and so over the next few months I did some
research at the University of Wisconsin Medical School library. Among the
literature I read was Alfred Crosby’s account of the 1918 outbreak in
America’s Forgotten Pandemic, which Gladwell had referenced in his New
Yorker article.18 I learned a great deal about the flu and did, in fact, give
the Governor an extensive briefing on the 1918 pandemic—probably much
more than he wanted. While this project of mine had absolutely no impact
on pandemic preparedness in Wisconsin in the late ‘90s, it did typecast me
as the public health preparedness point-man when Governor Thompson
was nominated to be President Bush’s first Secretary of Health and Human
Services. When it came time to brief the Governor for his confirmation
hearings, I was the person responsible for preparing him for whatever
influenza or biodefense questions he might get during the confirmation
process. And I have to say that no one—including me—expected that he
would get such questions. But I found this assignment interesting and the
Governor—to his credit—was eager to learn all that he could about public
health preparedness.

passim. There is no evidence that the 1918 pandemic emerged in Spain. But Spain was
neutral during World War I and, unlike the combatant countries, did not censor the press.
The 1918 disease became known as the Spanish Flu “very likely because newspapers were
publishing accounts of the spread of the disease that were picked up in other countries . . .
Spanish papers were filled with reports of the disease especially when King Alphonse XIII fell
seriously ill.” JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE
IN HISTORY 171 (2004).
16. Gladwell, supra note 14, at 61-64.
17. Such assignments were a regular occurrence in Governor Thompson’s office. During
the more than twenty years that I have known him, he has always had an acute sense of
intellectual curiosity. This was one reason I mentioned the Gladwell article to the Governor.
18. CROSBY, supra note 15.
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Pre-9/11

Governor Thompson was sworn in as HHS Secretary on February 2,
2001.19 I had decided not to leave Amtrak, where I had been serving as
Corporate Secretary and Counsel since 1999.20 I agreed, however, to
become a Special Government Employee (SGE) to work—without pay—on
preparedness issues during Secretary Thompson’s transition. After the
transition, I joined HHS full-time as Deputy General Counsel, then became
Special Counsel for Preparedness, and later was appointed Assistant
Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness.21
During the first seven months of the Bush administration, few in the
political ranks of the department, other than Secretary Thompson and
several senior aides, were particularly interested in public health
preparedness.22 There were a number of U.S. Public Health Service
(USPHS) officers and other career officials who were enormously dedicated
to preparedness, but, with a few exceptions, it was not a priority for political
appointees at HHS.23 In fairness, it was the beginning of the Administration
and so much was in play. At the time, the Bush stem cell policy was

19. Tommy Thompson, supra note 12.
20. OFFICE OF FED. REG., NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 476 (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/get
doc.cgi?dbname=2001_government_manual&docid=188578tx_xxx-81.pdf.
21. GEORGE W. BUSH, 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1172 app.
A (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2004_
public_papers_vol1_misc&page=1172&position=all. Following the events of September
2001, Secretary Thompson administratively established the Office of Public Health
Preparedness (OPHP) within the Office of the Secretary, HHS. This office was led by a
Director appointed by the Secretary. Dr. D.A. Henderson was appointed by Secretary
Thompson to be the first Director of OPHP. See D.A. Henderson to Direct New Office of
Public Health Preparedness, CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y, Nov. 6, 2001,
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/110601henderson.html. In
2002, Congress created the position of Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency
Preparedness, a presidential appointment. See 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-10 (2006). OPHP was
merged into the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness.
Several Acting Assistant Secretaries led the office (including Dr. William Raub) until 2004
when President Bush appointed me to be the first Assistant Secretary for Public Health
Emergency Preparedness.
22. Ladd Wiley, HHS Deputy General Counsel and a former colleague of mine in the
Governor’s Office, and Sally Canfield, Counselor to the Secretary and a Thompson transition
staffer, worked closely with me on preparedness policy development. In addition, Robert
Wood, Thompson’s Chief of Staff, assigned the department’s White House Fellow, Lt. Cdr.
Kathryn Allen, USN, to work on biodefense-related projects. See Kathryn Allen, Experiencing
the Transition, 26 WHITE HOUSE FELLOWS, no. 2, 2001 at 1, 3.
23. See generally Marilyn Werber Serafini & Gia Fenoglio, Health and Human Services
Department Profiles, 33 NAT’L J. 1948-52 (2001) (the lack of demonstrated interest by the
HHS heads illustrates that influenza was not their priority).
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emerging and there were a number of other highly charged issues on the
department’s agenda. Nevertheless, several times a week, I would leave
Union Station and travel across the Mall to the Hubert H. Humphrey
Building, HHS Headquarters, to spend a few hours on preparedness issues,
including pandemic preparedness. Secretary Thompson had directed CDC
to detail a senior physician to the Immediate Office of the Secretary to focus
on public health preparedness full-time24 and there were several career
officials in the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation working on preparedness. The Clinton Administration’s Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg, had done
excellent work in developing preparedness plans and directing preparedness
investments.25 I sought to pick-up where Dr. Hamburg had left off, and
Secretary Thompson was eager for me to do this. Indeed, he used to call
me in for briefings on a fairly regular basis. While most political appointees
in the department paid little or no attention to public health preparedness,
Secretary Thompson was committed to it from the outset. From tornadoes
to floods to forest fires, emergency preparedness and response is an
everyday fact of life for a governor. Whether a governor’s tenure is a
success or a failure can turn on how an emergency operation is managed.
Secretary Thompson saw public health preparedness in this context and the
same can be said for his successor at HHS, Governor Michael O. Leavitt.26
B.

9/11

As I indicated, Dr. Hamburg had been very effective in the Clinton
Administration in making public health preparedness a priority. She and her
staff made important, enduring contributions to pandemic planning and the
product of this effort became the foundation for our work. Indeed, on the
morning of September 11, 2001, a pandemic preparedness briefing was on
Secretary Thompson’s calendar.27 Once the second plane hit the World

24. Dr. Scott Lillibridge was formally named Special Assistant to the Secretary with
responsibility for bioterrorism preparedness on July 10, 2001. HHS Names Physician to
Coordinate Anti-Bioterrorism Initiatives, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (July 10, 2001),
http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20010710a.html.
25. Prior to her appointment as HHS Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Dr.
Hamburg was Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene for the City of New York. She
was one of the pioneers in biodefense and public health preparedness. In 2009, President
Obama appointed Dr. Hamburg to be Commissioner of Food and Drugs. Gardiner Harris,
Former New York Official Is Called Choice for F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at A20.
26. Gardiner Harris, Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005,
at A23.
27. This briefing was to be led by Dr. William Raub, then-Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. Dr. Raub had been Dr. Hamburg’s principal deputy
and he played an important role in providing continuity on public health preparedness matters
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Trade Center, the schedule was cleared and the pandemic preparedness
briefing was put on hold until later in 2001 or the beginning of 2002.
C. Post-9/11
Following the events of 9/11 and the anthrax letters later that month,28
Congress focused on improving public health preparedness in the United
States. Billions were sent to the states, through CDC and the Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), to build public health
infrastructure and substantial funds were appropriated to NIH to catapult
biodefense basic research forward—and this included work on influenza.29
But in 2001—another virus was in the headlines: smallpox.30 At the time, I
was focused almost exclusively on leading the contracting effort to
accelerate development of the second-generation smallpox vaccine.31 This

between administrations. He later served as Dr. Henderson’s deputy in the newly created
Office of Public Health Preparedness and later Acting Assistant Secretary for Public Health
Emergency Preparedness. Earlier in his career, Dr. Raub had been a Deputy Director of NIH.
See The NIH Almanac – Historical Data, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/historical/deputy_directors.htm (last
updated Nov. 9, 2010). He was a respected adviser to both Secretary Thompson and
Secretary Leavitt.
28. The Anthrax Letters, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/publication/
9555/anthrax_letters.html (last updated Jan. 2006). See also Sheryl Gay Solberg & Alison
Mitchell, A Nation Challenged: The Overview; Letter Containing Anthrax Sent to U.S. Senate
Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05EF
D81F3FF935A25753C1A9679C8B63&scp=2&sq=anthrax%20letters%20a%20nation%20c
hallenged%20overview&st=cse.
29. See HHS Provides $1.4 Billion More to States and Hospitals for Terrorism
Preparedness, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Sept. 2, 2003), http://archive.hhs.gov/
news/press/2003pres/20030902.html.
30. See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Countering the Small Pox Threat, 288 ATLANTIC MONTHLY
50, 50-51 (2001).
31. The contract to accelerate development of the second-generation smallpox vaccine
was awarded on November 28, 2001, to Acambis of Cambridge, Massachusetts. ACAMBIS,
INC., ACAM2000: SMALLPOX VACCINE: VACCINES AND RELATED BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (VRBPAC) BRIEFING DOCUMENT 7 (Apr. 18, 2007), available at http://www.fda.
gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4292B2-02.pdf. This contract was essentially the
continuation of the smallpox vaccine research and development project that Dr. Hamburg
launched in 1999. See Statement on Bioterrorism Before the S. Appropriations Subcomm.
Comm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ., & Related Agencies, 106th Cong. passim
(1999) (statement of Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg, Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/
t990316a.html; Donald A. Henderson et al., Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: Medical and
Public Health Management, 281 JAMA 2127, 2136 (1999); James W. LeDuc & Peter B.
Jahrling, Strengthening National Preparedness for Smallpox: An Update, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7
no1/leduc.htm.
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project was guided by a core group of scientists, including Dr. D.A.
Henderson,32 Dr. Anthony S. Fauci,33 Dr. John LaMontagne,34 Dr. Philip K.
Russell,35 Dr. James LeDuc,36 Dr. William Raub,37 and Dr. Scott Lillibridge.38
During one of the early meetings of this group, I recall a side discussion
with Dr. Fauci and Dr. LaMontagne about influenza. Dr. LaMontagne told
me that if anything would get us, it would not be smallpox, but the flu.39
32. Following the events of 9/11, Secretary Thompson personally recruited Dr.
Henderson to lead the newly created Office of Public Health Preparedness. He became the
architect of the post-9/11 HHS public health preparedness program and a mentor to many in
the department, including me. Dr. Henderson was precisely the type of leader this new office
needed in the dark days following 9/11. Earlier in his career, Dr. Henderson directed the
successful WHO-led effort to eradicate smallpox, one of mankind’s greatest achievements.
Following this, he was appointed Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health. D.A.
Henderson: Professional Profile, U. OF PITTSBURGH MED. CTR., http://www.upmcbiosecurity.org/website/center/staff/henderson.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). See also
D.A. HENDERSON, SMALLPOX: THE DEATH OF A DISEASE 290-92 (2009).
33. Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of
Health.
34. Late Deputy Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National
Institutes of Health.
35. Secretary Thompson, Dr. Henderson, and I recruited Dr. Russell to lead the
countermeasure Research and Development (R&D) program, within the Office of Public Health
Preparedness. Earlier in his career, Dr. Russell served as the Commanding Officer, U.S.
Army’s Medical Research and Materiel Command. By the Fall of 2001, Dr. Russell had long
since retired from the Army and was serving on the faculty of the Johns Hopkins School of
Public Health and the board of the Sabin Vaccine Institute. When it became clear how much
HHS needed him, Dr. Russell put aside his personal wishes and returned to government
service. His contributions to public health and biodefense are too numerous to list. See Philip
K. Russell, MD, SABIN VACCINE INST., http://www.sabin.org/about-us/executive/philip-k-russellmd (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). See also HENDERSON supra note 32, at 289-90.
36. Dr. James LeDuc, then-Director, CDC Division of Viral and Ricketsial Diseases, led
the CDC project team responsible for developing the second-generation smallpox vaccine.
He later served as the CDC influenza coordinator. See Influenza Coordination Unit Organizes
to Meet Pan Flu Threat, CCID SPECTRUM, Sept. 2006, http://www2.cdc.gov/spectrum/vol1no
4/CCID_influenza_coordination_unit.html. Today, he is Director of the Galveston National
Laboratory, University of Texas Medical Branch. See Garland D. Anderson, Message from the
Provost, available at http://www.som.utmb.edu/news/031510_GNL_IHII_Leadership.pdf. He
is one of the finest public servants with whom I have had the privilege to serve.
37. Then-Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services
38. Special Assistant to the Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. In
addition to these individuals, the successful effort to accelerate the development of the
second-generation smallpox vaccine benefited substantially from the expertise of the late
Joseph Gilchrist, Lorenzo Falgiano, Charlotte Flitcraft, Debra Yeskey, John Beecher, and
George French all of the CDC, and Katherine Drews and Jonathan Baker of the HHS Office
of General Counsel.
39. Dr. LaMontagne died in November 2004. Joe Holley, NIH Administrator John La
Montagne Dies, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2004, at B6. To honor Dr. LaMontagne and recognize
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And what I subsequently learned about the history and properties of the
influenza virus corroborated Dr. LaMontagne’s statement. It should be
noted that both Dr. Fauci and Dr. LaMontagne were integral to our work to
accelerate development of the second-generation smallpox vaccine and
their positive influence can be seen in everything we accomplished in
building a biodefense research and development program at HHS.40
But even with such staunch advocates, only modest progress had
occurred over the years in improving the U.S. licensed inactivated flu
vaccine.
Today’s licensed influenza vaccine is made using 1950s
technology.41 Essentially, embryonated chicken eggs serve as little bioreactors.42 Hundreds of thousands of chickens producing millions of eggs
are needed every year.43 Depending on how well the strains selected for
that year grow, vaccine production can take between six and nine months.44
And the process is vulnerable to any number of perils—including influenza
itself, which can kill the chickens producing the eggs needed to make the
vaccine.45
The events of September 2001 made bioterrorism our principal focus
and not influenza. And no one—then or now—thinks influenza is a serious
bioterror threat. Smallpox, anthrax, and other bioterrorism agents were our
top priority. But, pandemic influenza preparedness benefited in at least two
important ways from the heightened attention directed at bioterrorism. First
and foremost, NIH received a substantial increase in funding for
bioterrorism-related basic research and influenza research was included in

his lifelong commitment to influenza research and pandemic preparedness, HHS sponsored,
in 2005, the John R. LaMontagne Symposium on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness. The
LaMontagne Symposium was convened by the Institute of Medicine for the purpose of
identifying gaps in influenza research. See John R. LaMontagne Symposium on Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., http://www.iom.edu/Activities/
Disease/LaMontaigneFluSymp.aspx (last updated Oct. 11, 2009).
40. Dr. Fauci’s influence reached far beyond biodefense research and development.
During my five years at HHS, I consulted with Dr. Fauci on all manner of issues. Secretary
Thompson and Secretary Leavitt similarly relied on Dr. Fauci’s excellent judgment. He spent a
great deal of time teaching me--and other appointees--about emerging and reemerging
infectious diseases as well as about science policy and interagency diplomacy. But most
importantly, Dr. Fauci taught me an enormous amount about how to be a good public
servant. It was an honor to work with him.
41. Osterholm, supra note 9, at 1839.
42. Nell Greenfieldboyce, New and Old Ways to Make Flu Vaccines, NAT’L PUB. RADIO,
Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16105360.
See
Osterholm, supra note 9, at 1839-40.
43. Osterholm, supra note 9.
44. Id.
45. Greenfieldboyce, supra note 42.
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this portfolio.46 No amount of planning for a biological event like an
anthrax release or an influenza pandemic can overcome the absence of
effective medical countermeasures. The investment in biodefense basic
research that occurred after the events of September 2001 has contributed
to science’s understanding of the influenza virus and funded work, which will
surely lead to additions to the influenza armamentarium.47
Second, Secretary Thompson increased international engagement
related to public health preparedness by proposing that a group of health
ministers meet periodically to coordinate efforts to prepare for bioterror
events. In November 2001, health ministers from Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States
joined representatives from WHO and the European Commission in Ottawa
to establish the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI).48 The ministers
pledged to strengthen public health preparedness and response planning for
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear emergencies.49 At the
December 2002 GHSI ministerial meeting in Mexico City, Secretary
Thompson argued successfully to broaden GHSI’s mandate to include

46. See NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., FY 2010 BUDGET 7 (2010), available at http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/appro
priations/index.htm (2010) (In FY2002, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) received over $2.3 billion in funding, $187 million of which was directed at
biodefense. Today, NIAID receives more than $4.7 billion in funding, $1.6 billion of which is
directed at biodefense. See id. at 19.). NIAID is the NIH institute responsible for research to
“better understand, treat, and ultimately prevent infectious, immunologic, and allergic
diseases.” Who We Are and What We Do, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/Pages/default.aspx (last
updated Apr. 12, 2010). See also NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OPEN LETTER IN SCIENCE REGARDING NIH BIODEFENSE FUNDING 3
(2005), available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZMUNHfPzDu
sJ:www.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/2005/pages/scienceletter.aspx+biodefense+budge
t+NIAID&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com (showing that remarkable
increase in biodefense spending from $42 million in FY2001 to $187 million in FY2002 to
nearly $1.2 billion in FY2003); NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2009 FACT BOOK: A YEAR IN REVIEW passim (2010),
available at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/whoWeAre/Documents/fy09FactBook.pdf.
47. See The Role of NIH-Supported Research in the Response to 2009 H1N1 Influenza,
Statement Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & Related Agencies,
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. passim (2009) (statement of Anthony S. Fauci,
MD, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of
Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), available at http://www.niaid.nih.
gov/about/directors/Documents/110409niaidstatementlhhsh1n1.pdf.
48. Overview: Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI), GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY INITIATIVE,
http://www.ghsi.ca/english/background.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
49. Id.
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pandemic influenza preparedness.50 Since then, GHSI has included a
pandemic influenza working group. Adding influenza preparedness to
GHSI’s mandate created a framework for close coordination in the nascent
work of preparing for a pandemic.51
III. WHO INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE
Each May, the principal governing body of the World Health
Organization—the World Health Assembly—meets at the U.N. complex in
Geneva, Switzerland, where delegations from 193 Member States listen
more or less politely to a series of predictable speeches.52 In 2002 and
subsequently, I served on the U.S. delegation to the World Health Assembly.
In addition to the formal agenda for the Assembly, a number of sidemeetings, informal conferences and bilateral discussions occur.53 One such
meeting was an influenza surveillance briefing by WHO staff for the thenHHS Assistant Secretary for Health and me.54 We spent several hours
discussing the global influenza surveillance network and its gaps. We also
talked about readiness: how well prepared were Member States and what
could be done to improve it. When I returned to Washington, I briefed
Secretary Thompson on our pandemic discussions at WHO and he asked
that I develop a plan to improve our pandemic preparedness posture.
IV. ALFRED CROSBY—AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC
The first order of business in moving our pandemic preparedness effort
forward was to put the threat in context—in other words, to understand the
impact of the 1918 virus. As I noted, Professor Alfred Crosby’s book,
America’s Forgotten Pandemic, was cited in Malcolm Gladwell’s article.
Since Crosby’s book had made such an impact on me, I wanted to begin
our pandemic preparedness effort with a talk by him. I contacted Professor

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. World Health Assembly Opens, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 19, 2008),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2008/wha01/en/index.html.
53. In May 2004, for example, Secretary Thompson convened a pandemic preparedness
meeting with health ministers from Asia during the 57th World Health Assembly. This meeting
included ministers from countries then most at risk from H5N1. In addition to Secretary
Thompson and myself, U.S. participants included the following HHS officials: Dr. Bruce Gellin,
Dr. Nancy Cox, Dr. William Steiger, Mary Lou Valdez, and David Hohman; and Dr. Robert
Webster of the St. Jude’s Children’s Research Hospital, a world renowned influenza expert.
See Meeting minutes from the National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) (June 1-2,
2004) (on file with author).
54. In May 2002, Dr. Eve Slater, then-HHS Assistant Secretary for Health, and I met with
several WHO officials about global influenza surveillance: Dr. David Heyman, Dr. Klaus
Stohr, Dr. Mike Ryan, and Dr. Ray Arthur (a CDC assignee to WHO).
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Crosby at his home in New England and he agreed to come to Washington
to spend a few hours with most of the senior HHS officials—both political
and career—involved in influenza policymaking.55 Everyone in the room
knew about the 1918 pandemic and what—in general—it had done to the
country (and the world). But the magnitude of the disruption shocked me
(and others) then—as it still does today. What became clear to everyone
present was that we were not ready for a 1918-like event, not even close.
My colleagues and I left the Crosby talk with two priorities: (1) close gaps in
global influenza surveillance and (2) dramatically improve our capacity to
make influenza vaccine (both egg-based vaccine and, eventually, cellculture vaccine).
V. THE INFLUENZA INITIATIVE—$250 MILLION
Following a number of meetings and budget discussions, several HHS
thought leaders56 crafted a $250 million proposal to begin work on creating
a cell-culture influenza vaccine for the U.S. and to secure the egg supply for
The idea was to launch a Research and
the licensed vaccine.57
Development (R&D) initiative with one of the vaccine makers to produce a
cell-culture vaccine. At the time, there was no U.S. work of any significance
going on in this area. There was at least one cell-culture influenza vaccine
in pilot production in Europe,58 but no pharmaceutical firms at the time were
doing any influenza cell-culture work in the U.S. or for the U.S. market. So
we thought we could enter into a contract with Sanofi Pasteur or Chiron
(then the only makers of licensed inactivated flu vaccine for the U.S.) to
begin an R&D effort for cell-culture influenza vaccine and build new
capacity for cell-culture production. It is important to understand that there
is nothing revolutionary about cell-culture vaccine. There are a number of

55. Dr. D.A. Henderson introduced Professor Crosby and moderated the discussion. Dr.
Henderson was—and remains—a strong proponent for pandemic influenza preparedness.
56. This group included Lester Cash, William Beldon, and Kerry Weems of the HHS
budget office, and Dr. William Raub, then of the Office of Public Health Emergency
Preparedness.
57. The $250 million influenza vaccine initiative was part of a larger proposal to improve
the Nation’s domestic vaccine production capacity. The proposal was developed at the
request of Secretary Thompson and included what later became Project BioShield. See Ted
Agres, Bioshield Moving Forward: Unlimited Spending Authority and Industry Liability Remain
Key Stumbling Blocks, SCIENTIST, May 16, 2003, http://cmbi.bjmu.edu.cn/news/0305/
153.htm.
58. Baxter Receives European Commission Approval for CELVAPAN H1N1 Pandemic
Influenza Vaccine, BAXTER (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.baxter.com/press_room/press_releases/
2009/10_07_09-celvapan.html.
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licensed vaccines in the U.S. made with cell culture technology.59 But the
consensus among vaccine experts at HHS was that a cell culture influenza
vaccine would be more reliable than the currently licensed vaccine and it
would be readily scalable because cell culture vaccine production does not
require eggs. Instead, human cells or some other cell line are used in
bioreactors to make the vaccine.60 Cell-culture influenza vaccine would not
solve our pandemic preparedness problems, but it would be faster—by a
few months—and more secure.
In addition to developing a cell-culture vaccine for the U.S., we needed
to secure the egg supply for the licensed vaccine. As I mentioned, there are
hundreds of thousands of chickens producing millions of eggs each year for
the U.S. licensed influenza vaccine, but these chickens are vulnerable to
avian diseases, including influenza itself. If such a disease were to wipe out
the egg supply for the vaccine makers, the vaccine manufacturing process
would be set back a number of months, until the flock could be
reconstituted. The chickens that produce the eggs for vaccine production
are specialized—indeed, they have been bred for this work. So we needed
a contingency or standby flock—ready to step in if something should
happen to the primary flock.
The $250 million vaccine proposal funded both of these projects. Since
it was a relatively modest amount of money, we thought we stood a good
chance of getting it funded in the President’s 2004 budget request. But we
also understood that it often takes a few years to get a new initiative
approved and resourced. Each year, competing priorities run the budget
gauntlet where some do better than others. In the Fall of 2003, we learned
that the HHS influenza initiative fell into the latter category—it was not going
to be funded in the President’s 2004 budget. Initially we thought we would
need to wait for the 2005 request, but then an alternate strategy emerged.
As is well known, Vice President Cheney was an effective advocate for
biodefense and public health preparedness. During my five years at HHS, I
cannot recall a single week that I—and many others at HHS—did not have
contact with the Office of the Vice President.61 When we saw that the HHS
influenza initiative was not going to be funded in the President’s 2004
59. See generally STANLEY A. PLOTKIN, WALTER A. ORENSTEIN & PAUL A. OFFIT, VACCINES 5,
7 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that the “golden age of vaccine development” occurred in 1949,
using cell culture).
60. Greenfieldboyce, supra note 42.
61. Our principal interlocutor in the Office of the Vice President was Carol Kuntz, Ph.D.,
a Department of Defense career official who served as the Assistant to the Vice President for
Homeland Security. See OFFICE OF FED. REG., NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN.,THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2004/2005 90 (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004_government_manual&docid=198805tx_xxx19.pdf.
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budget, Secretary Thompson gave me permission to approach the Office of
the Vice President and seek their assistance in obtaining funding in the 2004
budget. I have a very specific recollection of a telephone conversation
between Secretary Thompson and an official at the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) about the pandemic vaccine initiative which concluded
with the Secretary saying: “I’ll have to go to the Veep on this.” Following
that conversation, I went to the White House and briefed Vice President
Cheney’s staff on the HHS influenza initiative.62 Vice President Cheney had
been President Ford’s Chief of Staff during the 1976 swine flu scare63 so he
already knew about the influenza threat in some detail. When he was
briefed on the HHS initiative, he signed on right away. Shortly thereafter,
Vice President Cheney and Secretary Thompson met with President Bush in
the Oval Office where they obtained the President’s approval for putting
$100 million into the President’s 2004 budget request.64 It was not what we
had requested, but it was a very good start. Unfortunately, as often
happens with new programs, Congress only partially funded the President’s
request and the result was a $50 million initiative—not enough to do
anything meaningful with cell-culture vaccine, but more than sufficient to
secure the egg supply for the licensed vaccine.65
The year 2004 turned out to be an inflection point for influenza
preparedness in the United States. In addition to the HHS vaccine being
launched, two events outside the U.S. persuaded policymakers to address
pandemic preparedness in earnest: following several years of apparent

62. This briefing included I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, Chief of Staff to the Vice President; Dr.
Carol Kuntz, Assistant to the Vice President for Homeland Security; Capt. Bruce Miller, USN,
Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for Homeland Security; Dr. Noreen Hynes, USPHS, an
HHS assignee in the Office of the Vice President.
63. STEPHEN F. HAYES, CHENEY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL AND
CONTROVERSIAL VICE PRESIDENT 78 (2007). See David J. Sencer & J. Donald Millar, Reflections
on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination Program, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 29, 29
(2006).
64. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY 2004 BUDGET IN BRIEF 91 (2004). Secretary
Thompson invested substantial amounts of political capital in pandemic preparedness well
before influenza was recognized outside of the public health community as much of a threat.
During his tenure at HHS, he consistently advocated for more resources to be invested in
pandemic preparedness. In his farewell press conference, Secretary Thompson identified
pandemic influenza as one of the greatest public health challenges facing the U.S. See
William Branigin, Mike Allen & John Mintz, Tommy Thompson Resigns from HHS, WASH. POST,
Dec. 3, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A31377-2004Dec3.html.
65. Secretary Thompson Announces Contract to Secure Future Egg Supply for Flu
Vaccines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Nov. 9, 2004, http://archive.hhs.gov/news/
press/2004pres/20041109a.html.
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dormancy, H5N1 reemerged in Hong Kong66 and in the very midst of the
2004 election, the Chiron seasonal influenza vaccine failed—resulting in a
loss of approximately half of the licensed U.S. influenza vaccine supply.67
VI. H5N1 REEMERGES (2003/2004)
Following the Hong Kong control effort in 1997, H5N1 did not show
itself again until the end of 2003—beginning of 2004: first in Hong Kong
and then Vietnam.68 This created sufficient anxiety within HHS and
elsewhere in the federal government to enable HHS to take two important
steps toward preparing for a pandemic. First, work began to develop a
vaccine against H5N1. And second, HHS purchased an initial quantity of

66. J.S.M. Peiris et al., Re-emergence of Fatal Human Influenza A Subtype H5N1 Disease,
363 LANCET 617, 617-19 (2004).
67. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RES., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIORESEARCH
MONITORING: WARNING LETTERS ISSUED TO EIGHT CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS CONDUCTING STUDIES
WITH INVESTIGATIONAL PRODUCTS 8 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/
EnforcementActions/EnforcementStory/EnforcementStoryArchive/UCM091058.pdf;
Andrew
Pollack, U.S. Will Miss Half Its Supply of Flu Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, October 6, 2004, at A20.
See also Flu Shot Shortage Looms, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 6, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/
2004/10/05/news/midcaps/chiron. The emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) in March of 2003 also played a role in focusing policymakers on pandemic influenza
preparedness. Initial reporting about SARS even referred to the virus as a “killer flu.” See
Thomas Crampton, Killer Flu Is Traced to a Hotel in Hong Kong, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar.
20, 2003, at 9. Concern about the spread of SARS also led President Bush in April 2003 to
amend the list of quarantinable diseases to include SARS. The last time a disease was added
to the list had been in 1983 when President Reagan amended the list to include Ebola and
other hemorrhagic fevers. Exec. Order No. 12,452, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1983), as amended by
Exec. Order No. 13,375 (2005), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/
codification/executive-order/12452.html. President Bush amended the list again in April
2005 to include influenza viruses with pandemic potential on the list of quarantinable
diseases. See Exec. Order No. 13,375 (2005), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/
cfr_2006/janqtr/pdf/3CFR13375.pdf.
68. Peiris et al., supra note 66, at 617; Y.L. Lau, Editorial, Avian Influenza, 9 HONG
KONG J. PAEDIATRICS 101, 101 (2004), available at http://hkjpaed.org/details.asp?id=61&
show=1234. The successful effort to contain H5N1 in Hong Kong in 1997 was led by Dr.
Margaret Chan, Hong Kong’s health officer. Following the death in 2006 of Dr. J. W. Lee,
WHO Director General, Dr. Chan was elected Director General and remains in that post
today. Prior to her election, she was Assistant Director General for Communicable Diseases
and the Director General’s Special Representative for Pandemic Influenza. EMMA CHANLETTAVERY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33871, FOREIGN COUNTRIES’ RESPONSE TO THE AVIAN
INFLUENZA (H5N1) VIRUS: CURRENT STATUS 6 (2007); Dr. Margaret Chan, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/dg/en/ (last visited November 19, 2010); Former Director-General Dr.
LEE Jong-wook, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/dg/lee/en/ (last visited Nov. 19,
2010).
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Tamiflu for the Strategic National Stockpile.69 But this later action was not
without controversy. Several officials outside of HHS questioned the need
for acquiring influenza antiviral drugs and even wondered about whether the
Strategic National Stockpile70 had legal authority to make such purchases.
These objections made it perfectly clear that there was no consensus within
the Bush Administration about the severity of the pandemic threat. To
address this problem, I hosted a series of presentations on influenza in the
Secretary’s Conference Room at HHS, including discussions on the 1918,
1957, and 1968 pandemics, the 1976 swine flu affair,71 and the 1997
emergence of H5N1 in Hong Kong.72 In addition to HHS officials, these
sessions were attended by individuals from OMB, the Office of the Vice
President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Office of Science and
Technology Policy. The purpose was to educate colleagues about the virus
and the potential threat. But while the sessions were generally successful
and a broader understanding of the pandemic threat resulted, there
remained little consensus on how much should be invested in preparing for
a pandemic.
VII. 2004 CHIRON VACCINE CRISIS
By 2004, there were only two makers of U.S. licensed inactivated flu
vaccine: Sanofi Pasteur and Chiron.73 Medimmune was licensed to make
the live attenuated Flumist vaccine74—but their capacity was fairly modest.
Approximately one-half of the inactivated vaccine was made in the U.S. by
Sanofi Pasteur75 and one-half made in Liverpool, UK by Chiron.76 Late in
the Summer of 2004—an election year—we learned that the Liverpool plant
had been inspected by the United Kingdom’s Medicine and Healthcare
Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the British equivalent to the FDA, and
the MHRA had concluded that the Chiron plant had major deficiencies in

69. Tamiflu® (Oseltamivir) and Relenza® (Zanamivir) were the only licensed antiviral drugs
effective against H5N1. See Anne Moscona, Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Influenza, 353
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1363, 1373 (2005).
70. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN 8 (2005),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf.
71. See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DECISIONMAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE passim (1978).
72. These sessions included presentations by Dr. D.A. Henderson, Dr. Jeffrey
Taubenberger of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Dr. Michael Osterholm of the
University of Minnesota, Dr. James LeDuc, and Dr. Nancy Cox, Chief of the CDC Influenza
Branch.
73. Flu Shot Shortage Looms, supra note 67.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

22

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:5

regulatory compliance.77 The result was that the MHRA would not release
the Chiron vaccine.78 Suddenly the U.S. had lost half of its flu vaccine and
just in time for the first presidential debate. So, for a time, the influenza
vaccine became a rather hot political topic—even then-Governor Rod
Blagojevich got into the act by purchasing a number of lots of un-licensable
influenza vaccine from Europe.79 Luckily, the flu was not particularly severe
in 200480 and Sanofi Pasteur, the remaining supplier of licensed inactivated
flu vaccine, did excellent work to make up for the loss of the Chiron vaccine.
In fact, at the end of the 2004/2005 flu season, thousands of doses had
gone unused.81
The reemergence of H5N1 and the loss of the Chiron vaccine together
signaled the beginning of the end of influenza’s time in the political
wilderness. Suddenly, it became a political liability to ignore influenza
preparedness. Accordingly, the President’s 2005 budget submission again
requested $100 million for the HHS pandemic vaccine initiative and this
time Congress funded the total amount.82 We also substantially increased
77. Flu Vaccine License is Suspended, BBC NEWS, Oct. 5, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/health/3717726.stm.
78. Id.
79. FDA Yet to Deal with Many Details of States Importing Flu Vaccine, FDA WEEK, Nov.
12, 2004, at 1, 9; David Bernstein, Mr. Un-Popularity, CHICAGO MAG. (2008), http://www.chi
cagomag.com/core/pagetools.php?pageid=7444&url=%2FChicago-Magazine%2FFebruary
-2008%2FMr-Un-Popularity%2F&mode=print.
80. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
AVIAN INFLUENZA: CURRENT H5N1 SITUATION (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/
avian/outbreaks/pdf/current.pdf; 2004-2005 U.S. Influenza Season Summary, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 7, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives
2004-2005/04-05summary.htm; Influenza Pandemics, HIST. OF VACCINES, http://www.history
ofvaccines.org/content/articles/influenza-pandemics (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
81. SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32655, INFLUENZA VACCINE SHORTAGES
AND IMPLICATIONS 6 tbl.1 (2004); Lon McQuillan et al., Impact of the 2004_2005 Influenza
Vaccine Shortage on Pediatric Practice: A National Survey 123 PEDIATRICS e186, e188 (2009);
Strengthening the Nation’s Influenza Vaccination System: An NVAC Assessment, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/influenzareportfinal1204.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2010). Had more vaccine been needed, it could have been lawfully
imported from foreign sources. Following the loss of the Chiron vaccine, HHS created a
special program that granted Investigational New Drug (IND) status to certain foreign-made
influenza vaccines so that these products could have been imported to the U.S. under an IND
protocol through a system developed by the Office of the Secretary, CDC, FDA, NIH, HRSA,
and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). See Influenza Vaccine Supply,
Statement Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Res., 109th Cong. passim (2005) (statement
of Jesse L. Goodman, Director, Center for Biologics, Evaluation, and Research), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm161669.htm.
82. FY2004 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 64, at 102. See also HHS awards $97 Million
Contract to Develop Cell Culture-Based Influenza Vaccine, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., Apr. 1, 2005, http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20050401.html.
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our stockpiling of influenza antiviral drugs known to be effective against
H5N1.83
VIII. THE GREAT INFLUENZA
But the push to prepare in historic, sustainable terms began with the
publication of John Barry’s magnificent book, The Great Influenza.84 As I
noted, the 2005 budget made a meaningful investment in cell-culture
vaccine. Thanks to this funding, a contract was awarded to Sanofi Pasteur
to begin serious R&D work on a cell culture influenza vaccine.85 But in the
world of vaccine development, $100 million does not go very far.86 If we
were going to drastically change our vaccine production infrastructure to
keep pace with the emergence and reemergence of pandemic strains, the
U.S. would need to invest billions.
At the end of 2004, Secretary Thompson left HHS for the private sector
and was replaced by Michael O. Leavitt, the former Governor of Utah and,
more recently, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).87
It was not a foregone conclusion that Governor Leavitt would retain me as
an Assistant Secretary. Like all HHS division and office heads, I went to EPA
to brief Governor Leavitt about my office and our mission. This meeting was
framed as a substantive discussion, but it was also an audition.88 I gave him

83. HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, supra note 70, at F-38.
84. BARRY, supra note 15. Since the release of The Great Influenza, Barry has continued
his research on the 1918 outbreak and made important contributions to pandemic
preparedness. See generally John M. Barry, Cecile Viboud & Lone Simonsen, Crossprotection Between Successive Waves of the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic: Epidemiological
Evidence from US Army Camps and from Britain, 198 J INFECTIOUS DISESEASES 1427 (2008);
JOHN M. BARRY, WHITE PAPER ON NOVEL H1N1: PREPARED FOR THE MIT CENTER FOR ENGINEERING
SYSTEMS FUNDAMENTALS passim (2009), available at http://esd.mit.edu/wps/2009/esd-wp2009-07-072709.pdf; John Barry, 5 Things You Didn’t Know About the Flu, Sept./Oct. 2010,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/the_flu.
85. HHS Awards Contracts Totaling More than $1 Billion to Develop Cell-Based Influenza
Vaccine, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., May 4, 2006, http://archive.hhs.gov/news/
press/2006pres/20060504.html.
86. SANOFI AVENTIS, SANOFI PASTEUR AWARDED $97 MILLION HHS CONTRACT TO
ACCELERATE CELL-CULTURE PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE DEVELOPMENT (2005), available at
http://en.sanofi-aventis.com/binaries/050405_PDF_Cell_Culture_media_tcm28-14866.pdf.
87. Biography of Mike Leavitt, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/dhhssec.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2010); Tommy Thompson, Secretary of Health & Human Services (20012005), WHITE HOUSE, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/thompsonbio.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
88. This meeting included Rich McKeown, Governor Leavitt’s Chief of Staff at EPA;
Natalie Gochnour, EPA Associate Administrator for Public Affairs; and Kerry Weems, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Budget, Technology and Finance, HHS. McKeown and Gochnour (who
accompanied Governor Leavitt to HHS) and Weems were instrumental in developing and
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an in-depth briefing on the department’s preparedness mission—for both
bioterrorism and naturally occurring threats. At the conclusion of the
meeting, I gave Governor Leavitt a copy of The Great Influenza and
suggested he read it. I told him it was a good primer on the pandemic
threat. Once he had been confirmed and in office a few weeks, I asked
Secretary Leavitt if he had had a chance to read the book. He said he was
about half way through and that what he had read thus far was sobering—
to say the very least. About a month after this, the Secretary called me to his
office and asked how long it would take me to prepare a highlighted and
tabbed version of The Great Influenza. I told him I could have it done by
the end of the day. A week or so later, I was in the Secretary’s outer office
and there was an assembly line of people tabbing and highlighting the book
according to my template. The Secretary told me that he intended to give a
tabbed and highlighted copy of the book to members of the various
Congressional committees with jurisdiction over HHS. I have to admit I was
skeptical that this would amount to much, but nothing else had worked so it
seemed worth a try. Over the course of several months, Secretary Leavitt
met (individually or in groups) with dozens of Senators and Members of
Congress. He distributed tabbed and highlighted copies of The Great
Influenza, described the pandemic threat, and told them HHS needed an
immediate, substantial infusion of resources to deal with it. Following one
of Secretary Leavitt’s closed-door sessions about the pandemic threat,
Senator Harry Reid remarked that the briefing “scared the hell out of me.”89
Shortly thereafter, Congress included approximately $3.3 billion for
pandemic preparedness in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of
2006.90 In May 2006, HHS announced that it had entered into contracts
totaling more than $1 billion with five pharmaceutical firms to develop cellculture influenza vaccine.91 Less than two years before, $100 million for
cell-culture vaccine was out of the question. But in the fall of 2005,
pandemic influenza was finally getting the attention it deserved.
IX. INFLUENZA: THE MAIN ATTRACTION
Once pandemic influenza captured the attention of political leaders and
policymakers, a number of changes occurred in the way the influenza policy

executing Leavitt’s pandemic preparedness strategy. All three made meaningful and enduring
contributions to pandemic preparedness.
89. Harris, Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington, supra note 26.
90. Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
119 Stat. 2783, 2786.
91. See HHS Awards Contracts, supra note 85.
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was developed and executed. Thanks in large part to Secretary Leavitt’s
advocacy, The White House focused like a laser on pandemic
preparedness.92 The White House Homeland Security Council (HSC) led a
major effort to develop a national pandemic plan, which covered all
The HSC also
departments and sectors of critical infrastructure.93
established an uncommonly productive interagency process, which ensured
a coordinated and rational approach to addressing pandemic preparedness
on a national scale, including liability related to pandemic vaccines and
other countermeasures.94 Few would dispute that domestic public health
resilience benefited mightily from the Bush Administration’s commitment to
pandemic preparedness and biodefense.95 The truth of this assertion can be
seen in the response to H1N1.96

92. Secretary Leavitt’s leadership on pandemic preparedness was exemplary. Had he not
made pandemic preparedness a personal priority, I doubt whether the U.S. would have been
in much of a position to respond to H1N1.
93. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-781, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC:
FURTHER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE CLEARER FEDERAL LEADERSHIP ROLES AND AN EFFECTIVE
NATIONAL STRATEGY 2 (2007). The HSC influenza effort was ably led first by Dr. Ken Bernard,
then by Dr. Rajeev Venkayya, and finally by Dr. Robert Kadlec. All three made important
contributions to pandemic preparedness.
94. Liability is a perennial issue in emergency preparedness, especially when a vaccine or
other countermeasure is involved. The Administration worked with Congress to address this
obstacle to pandemic preparedness in the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act,
which was signed into law by President Bush on December 30, 2005. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d6d (2006). See also Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) for
Pandemic Influenza Medical Countermeasures Utilization Protocol & Decision Tools, FLU.GOV,
http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/prep_act.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
95. For example, Secretary Leavitt convened officials from all fifty states and relevant
federal departments (i.e., HHS, USDA, and the Department of Homeland Security) on
December 5, 2005, to begin the process of developing integrated pandemic preparedness
plans for each state. Pandemic planning summits were then held in all fifty states. See
Pandemic Planning: A Convening of the States, FLU.GOV, http://www.flu.gov/professional/
states/convening.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). An important element of the Bush
Administration’s biodefense agenda was the Project BioShield Act of 2004, which, among
other things, created the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA). EUAs were used to make
available influenza countermeasures. Emergency Use Authorization Granted for BioCryst’s
Peramivir, BIOCRYST PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (Oct. 23, 2009), http://investor.shareholder.com/
biocryst/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=417887. See also Stuart L. Nightingale, Joanna M.
Prasher & Stewart Simonson, Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to Enable Use of Needed
Products in Civilian and Military Emergencies, United States, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
1046, 1046-51 (2007); HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, supra note 70, at S6-1, S6-3, S6-12.
96. Indeed, President Obama complimented the Bush Administration’s effort to prepare
for an influenza pandemic. See President Barack Obama, News Conference by the President
(Apr. 29, 2009) (transcript available at Speeches and Remarks, WHITE HOUSE, Apr. 30, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/News-Conference-by-the-President-4/29/
2009/).
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The Administration’s focus on pandemic preparedness included
international public health engagement on a historic scale. Until 2005,
influenza planning at the federal level was almost entirely the responsibility
of two agencies: HHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
Since influenza is a disease of animals that can affect humans, USDA and
HHS share responsibility for influenza-related policymaking. Other agencies
like the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) were engaged in influenza
decision-making to the extent such decisions affected them, but national
contingency planning and international engagement were largely left to
HHS and USDA. In 2005, this changed. The continuing spread of H5N1
combined with the publication of The Great Influenza galvanized national
interest in the pandemic threat and the need for serious planning. The
HSC-led interagency process focused on the development of President
Bush’s National Pandemic Plan.97 The Bush Administration also recognized
that like all of nature, influenza operates outside of the control of human
institutions and political jurisdictions. So, international engagement was
essential if any meaningful progress was to be made in planning for the next
pandemic. Accordingly, the State Department was tapped to lead an effort
to build international support for pandemic planning.
Three multilateral international organizations have subject matter
jurisdiction over influenza: WHO, the UN’s Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).98
Prior to 2005, HHS dealt with WHO on influenza-related matters with little
or no oversight from the State Department or any other agency of the U.S.
government. The same can largely be said for USDA and its influenza
related work with FAO and OIE. Furthermore, in ministerial meetings,
influenza rarely surfaced on the agenda or during informal discussions. But,
this changed in September 2005 when President Bush announced in a
speech to the UN General Assembly the formation of the International
Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza (IPAPI).99 The objective of
IPAPI was to develop a consensus on ten core principals that would govern
More than eighty countries and eight
pandemic preparedness.100
international organizations participated in the IPAPI process.101 And while
97. See HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (2005),
available at http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/pandemic-influenza.pdf.
98. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH & WORLD HEALTH
ORG., THE FAO-OIE-WHO COLLABORATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.fao.org/
docrep/012/ak736e/ak736e00.pdf.
99. U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 2d plen. mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.2 (Sept. 14, 2005).
100. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.
gov/pandemicflu/plan/appendixh.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
101. Id.
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there was nothing particularly novel about the core principals or the
process, IPAPI raised the profile of influenza preparedness and ensured that
it would remain an element of international dialogue for the remainder of
the Bush administration and beyond. The State Department’s involvement in
pandemic international engagement went well beyond IPAPI. In November
2005, the State Department and HHS co-led the U.S. delegation to a
special WHO meeting on pandemic preparedness.102 In 2006, the
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, named Ambassador Nancy Powell as
the State Department’s first Special Representative for Avian and Pandemic
Influenza103 and she was succeeded by Ambassador John Lange in 2007 as
Special Representative.104 Under President Obama and Secretary Clinton,
the State Department has remained at the center of pandemic international
engagement.
In March of 2009, the Administration designated
Ambassador Robert Loftis as the Special Representative for Avian and
Pandemic Influenza.105
Beginning in 2005 and continuing through the end of the Bush
administration, HHS sought to improve global influenza surveillance by
building capacity at WHO as well as partnering with the Institut Pasteur,
which operates a network of thirty-two laboratories in Europe, Asia, Africa,
Latin America, and other international public health institutions.106 At
WHO, HHS established a fund to defray the cost of shipping influenza
specimens from poorer countries to one of WHO’s influenza collaborating
laboratories.107 My HHS colleagues and I had been told by WHO that the
cost of shipping such samples was a major impediment to closing the gaps

102. See Meeting on Avian Flu and Human Pandemic Influenza, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2005/avian_influenza/meeting_avian_influenza/en/in
dex.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010); Meeting on Avian Flu and Human Pandemic Influenza:
Provisional List of Participants, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/
2005/avian_influenza/LOP_AvianInfluenza2.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
103. 2006 Homeland Security Medal Recipient, SERV. TO AM. MEDALS, http://serviceto
americamedals.org/SAM/recipients/profiles/hsm06_powell.shtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
104. Vivian Keller, Coming to America?, STATE MAG., June 2006, at 22, 24.
105. Biography: Robert Geers Loftis, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
biog/124222.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
106. Missions, INSTITUT PASTEUR, http://www.pasteur-international.org/ip/easysite/pasteurinternational-en/institut-pasteur-international-network/missions (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
107. WORLD HEALTH ORG., TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR WHO H5 REFERENCE LABORATORIES
(2006), available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/torh5reflab2006.pdf. See also
Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Remarks at WHO Plenary
Session (May 22, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/speech/2006/
060522.html). The UK Secretary of State for Health, Rt. Hon. John Reid, announced a major
contribution to this fund at the 2004 GHSI ministerial meeting in Paris. Dr. David Harper,
Chief Scientist, UK Department of Health, was instrumental in directing this contribution to the
influenza specimen transport fund.
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in the global influenza surveillance program. HHS also assigned HHS
scientists to work at the WHO influenza program in Geneva and provided
funding to WHO for an array of influenza preparedness activities, including
logistics planning and policy development.108
Establishing a partnership between HHS and Institut Pasteur turned out
to be a more sensitive undertaking than I had anticipated when I first
proposed it. The relationship between HHS and Institut Pasteur had been
strained for years as a result of a dispute related to the discovery of HIV.109
The initial overture to Pasteur was somewhat controversial within HHS. But,
if we were to make any real progress on closing the gaps in influenza
surveillance, the Institut Pasteur network had to be part of the solution. In
places at greatest risk from H5N1, like Cambodia, Institut Pasteur operated
the only laboratory capable of isolating the virus.110 So, my HHS colleagues
and I worked long and hard to build a partnership with Institut Pasteur.111

108. Dr. Stuart Nightingale, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer, HHS
Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, led an effort to gain adoption of a resolution
from the 58th World Health Assembly supporting expedited pandemic influenza planning.
This resolution was adopted by the Assembly on May 23, 2005, and formed the legal
foundation for much of what WHO did to prepare for a pandemic. G.A. Res. 58/5. ¶ 2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/58/5 (May 23, 2005). It would be difficult to overstate Dr. Nightingale’s
contribution to pandemic preparedness, but his service at HHS reached well beyond influenza
and touched every corner of public health. Collaborating with Dr. Nightingale was one of the
high points of my tenure at HHS.
109. See Institut Pasteur v. United States, 814 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Pasteur claimed
that the National Cancer Institute (NCI), an HHS agency, had breached express and implied
contracts to share research and recognition related to AIDS virus samples provided by Pasteur
to NCI. Id. at 626. Pasteur alleged that NCI scientists used these samples to acquire
information which enabled the U.S. to file patent applications for an HIV diagnostic kit. Id.).
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Claims and remanded the
case for further proceedings. But an out of court settlement was reached following
negotiations between high-ranking U.S. and French officials. An agreement signed by
President Reagan and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac provided that credit for the discovery
would be shared between the NCI and Pasteur scientists and that income derived from the
diagnostic kit patents would be divided between the U.S. and Institut Pasteur (both would, in
turn, contribute a percentage of their share of the royalties to a newly created international
AIDS research institute). See Howard L. Singer, Institut Pasteur v. United States: The AIDS
Patent Dispute, the Contract Disputes Act and the International Exchange of Scientific Data, 25
AM. J.L. & MED. 439 (1989). See also Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. and France End Rift on AIDS,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1987, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE0DF1231F
932A35757C0A961948260.
110. INSTITUT PASTEUR, INSTITUT PASTEUR INTERNAT’L NETWORK & WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
PARTNERSHIPS 4 (2009), available at http://www.pasteurfoundation.org/pdf/IP-WHO%20
Collaborations.pdf.
111. The following HHS officials were instrumental in developing the partnership with
Institut Pasteur: Dr. H. Clifford Lane, Dr. Carole Heilman, Dr. Stuart Nightingale, Dr. Amar
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Thanks to supportive leadership at Pasteur112 and a genuine desire on both
sides to close the book on the HIV dispute, HHS and Institut Pasteur
executed a memorandum of understanding creating a partnership on
influenza surveillance.113 During this period, HHS also funded influenza
surveillance projects in Vietnam,114 reestablished a relationship with the
Gorgas Memorial Institute (GMI) in Panama,115 and substantially increased
funding for influenza surveillance at the International Centre for Diarrheal
Disease Research in Dhaka, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B).116 These partnerships
remain active today and form the basis for joint influenza surveillance
projects worldwide.
X. THE FUTURE
During the eight years of the Bush Administration, an enormous amount
of effort and political capital went into pandemic preparedness. Without
this work, the U.S. would not have been in any position during the
2009/2010 season to produce both an annual trivalent vaccine and a
special monovalent vaccine (H1N1).117 While the H1N1 pandemic turned
out to be substantially less severe than either the 1957 or 1968 pandemics,

Bhat, Capt. Philip Budashewitz, USPHS, Dr. Bruce Gellin, Dr. Linda Lambert, Dr. James
LeDuc, Dr. William Steiger, and Lily Engstrom.
112. The partnership with Institut Pasteur would not have been possible without the
unwavering commitment of Prof. Alice Dautry, President, Institut Pasteur, Amb. Michele
Boccoz, then-Executive Vice President, Institut Pasteur, Dr. Paul Brey, Institut Pasteur’s
Southeast Asia Regional Advisor and Caitlin Hawke, Executive Director, Pasteur Foundation.
113. HHS and Institut Pasteur Partner on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (February 6, 2006), http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20
060206.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). See also HHS Partnership on Pandemic
Preparedness, PASTEUR FOUND., http://www.pasteurfoundation.org/dhhs.shtml (last visited
Nov. 19, 2010).
114. Agreement on Health and Medical Sciences Cooperation Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (July 28, 2009), http://www.globalhealth.gov/news/
agreements/ia072006.html.
115. HHS Secretary and Panamanian Health Minister and Gorgas Memorial Institute Agree
to Expand Cooperative Public Health Efforts, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (April 14,
2006), http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060414.html.
116. HHS Assistant Secretary Simonson Travels to Bangladesh and India to Enhance
Planning for a Potential Influenza Pandemic, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (April 27,
2006), http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060427.html.
117. Final Estimates for 2009-10 Seasonal Influenza and Influenza A (H1N1) 2009
Monovalent Vaccination Coverage – United States, August 2009 Through May, 2010, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/
coverage_0910estimates.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2010); 2001 H1N1 Vaccine Doses
Allocated, Ordered, and Shipped by Project Area, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/vaccinesupply.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2010).
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imagine what would have happened if H1N1 had been even half as deadly
as the 1918 pandemic. Thanks to investments in infrastructure and effective
project management at HHS, a special H1N1 vaccine was ready in time to
have an impact. But, this may not be the case next time. The fact is that a
campaign vaccine made with 1950s technology and totally dependent on
chickens is no way to prepare for a threat like the 1918 pandemic. Even
with a contingency flock and extreme biosecurity, the current vaccine is
vulnerable to catastrophic failure—that is, loss of the flocks that lay the eggs
that make the vaccine. And yield remains a major variable that can be
better controlled with cell-culture production. But the only way to take
influenza off the table as a threat is to develop and license a universal
vaccine—one that protects against all influenza viruses and that can be
administered in advance of a pandemic strain emerging. Such a vaccine is
years away and will require substantial, consistent funding from Congress.
The U.S. and other developed countries also need to do much more to
provide pandemic preparedness assistance to the developing world. Today,
influenza is essentially a disease of wealthy countries. Not that it only
sickens people from such countries—obviously this is not the case. But for
those who live in the developing world, there is absolutely no reasonable
expectation of ever seeing influenza vaccine or antiviral drugs, no matter
how severe the outbreak. So, influenza is a disease of the well-to-do
because only the well-to-do can do anything about it. This might be a
purely humanitarian concern if it were not for two considerations. First,
developing countries are an essential partner in influenza surveillance.
Remember H5N1 is widespread in Asia.118 And many countries most at risk
for the emergence or re-emergence of novel influenza viruses—viruses with
pandemic potential—have absolutely no incentive to spend precious
resources on looking for an infectious disease that they can do nothing
about. This must change if we expect their full participation in infectious
disease surveillance. They must have access to the fruits of their labor—and
in time to make a difference. Providing developing countries access to
vaccine—and in quantities sufficient to protect them—is one way to
incentivize their full participation in the global influenza surveillance
enterprise.
The second reason developing countries are important to U.S.
pandemic preparedness is that the world is many orders of magnitude more
connected today than it was in 1918. We have a vested interest in
preventing the developing world from being ravaged by a pandemic. When
I say we have a vested interest, I mean this to include a national security
interest. Today, manufacturing in the U.S. relies heavily on the developing

118. HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, supra note 70, at B-7.
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world for raw materials and constituent components. And so much of what
we consume comes from abroad. Last year when H1N1 was still spreading,
a British newspaper reported that a U.N. analysis concluded that H1N1
could cause large-scale anarchy in the developing world unless vaccine and
antiviral drugs were made available to these countries.119 And H1N1 was
known at that time to be a relatively mild virus. Imagine what such a U.N.
analysis would say about a 1918-like event.
Logic seems to compel, then, that the U.S. and other developed
countries consistently and meaningfully invest in influenza preparedness.
We need to improve and secure egg-based infrastructure, license a cellculture vaccine, discover better diagnostics, and develop a recombinant
vaccine. And while it may take years to achieve, our (properly funded) goal
must always be a universal influenza vaccine—the Holy Grail of influenza
preparedness. As we make advances, we also must ensure that developing
countries have meaningful access to these advances and share in our
improved ability to protect ourselves. But, all of this takes money and a
great deal of it. Now that the H1N1 pandemic is over, there will be
enormous pressure to declare victory and move on. Indeed, there has
already been at least one attempt to shift funding away from the HHS
pandemic preparedness program.120 While we have come a long way in
the last few years, it is simply not intellectually honest to say that we are
ready for a 1918-like event.121
The 1918 pandemic was a catastrophe and there is absolutely no
reason to think it will not happen again—quite the contrary. And while the
H1N1 was a mild pandemic, it should remind us how vulnerable we are to
the caprices of Mother Nature. The only way to protect ourselves against a
1918-like catastrophe is to invest in the full-range of influenza
countermeasures, including recombinant vaccines. In hard times this is a
difficult sell. But, if we choose to ignore the danger and take solace in the
experience of the H1N1, we will live to regret it.122

119. Rajeev Syal, Poor Nations Need £900m to Avert Swine Flu Disaster, OBSERVER, Sept.
20, 2009, at A23.
120. See Matishak, supra note 6.
121. See Martin Enserink & Jon Cohen, The Novel H1N1 Influenza, 326 SCIENCE 1607,
1607 (2009).
122. It is difficult to overstate the devastation that can be wrought by pandemic influenza.
Indeed, the 1918 pandemic has been compared with the Black Death. See ALFRED W.
CROSBY, supra note 15, at 257 (In discussing factors that influenced morbidity and mortality
during the 1918 pandemic, Professor Crosby observed that “[i]f either complacency,
incompetency, sickness, or bad luck crippled the ability of the leaders to react efficiently to the
pandemic, then Spanish influenza could be as deadly as the Black Death.” Id.).
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